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Abstract 
Overall, collective bargaining coverage has dropped by around fourteen percentage points. This paper 
investigates the causes and consequences of the decline in collective bargaining in Britain between 1990 and 
1998. One in three workplaces that practiced collective bargaining in 1990 had abandoned it by 1998 and the 
incidence and coverage of collective bargaining in newer workplaces was lower than in the workplaces they 
replaced. The abandonment of collective bargaining was not associated with an increase in individualised 
payment mechanisms or with the use of ‘high involvement’ HRM practices. Workplaces that abandoned 
bargaining reported less impressive productivity gains than other workplaces. Male wage inequality rose as a 
result of the decline of bargaining coverage and of weaker unions where collective bargaining remained. Higher 
levels of job creation in workplaces that abandoned collective bargaining balance these negative outcomes. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In Britain today, around 34 percent of the workforce have their pay and conditions 
determined by collective bargaining. This figure has changed only a little since 1998 
(Kersley et al. 2005). Bargaining coverage has declined dramatically from a high 
point of 85 per cent in the mid to late 1970s. It is now lower than at any time since 
1940 (Milner, 1995: 82). Given the key role of collective bargaining in the regulation 
of the employment relationship, this is not a trivial change. While the broad causes of 
British union decline are well known (cf. Brown & Wadhwani 1990, Brown et al. 
1997, Dunn & Metcalf 1996, Kelly 1990, Metcalf 2001 and Pencavel 2003), relatively 
little is known about the specific causes and consequences of the decline in collective 
bargaining coverage in the 1990s. What we do know is largely confined to pages 196 
– 199 of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey sourcebook (Millward et al. 
2000), and case studies of Brown et al. (1998).  
With this in mind, the aims of this paper are four-fold. First it attempts to 
measure more accurately the precise nature of the decline in aggregate collective 
bargaining coverage for the period 1990 – 1998. Second, it asks what are the factors 
likely to have caused de-collectivisation? Third, it investigates the pay-setting and 
workplace governance arrangements that are replacing collective bargaining. Is de-
collectivisation is leading to ‘substantive individualisation’ or ‘procedural 
individualisation’ of pay setting arrangements (Brown et al. 1998)? 
Do workplaces that abandon or fail to adopt collective bargaining have 
different systems of workplace governance, for example by making more extensive 
use of High Involvement Management systems, compared to workplaces that have 
collective bargaining? Fourth, it investigates the impact of abandoning collective 
bargaining on outcomes. Specifically, managerial perceptions of establishment 
performance and wage inequality.  
Data to accomplish these tasks comes from the 1990 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS90), the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS98), its associated panel survey and the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). The WIRS/WERS series offers the largest and most representative set of 
establishment level survey data available on the determination of pay in the context of 
wider employment relations structures and policies (Millward et al. 2000: 3 – 9). The   4 
BHPS is a longitudinal panel data set consisting of 5,500 households and around 
10,000 individuals and includes information on pay, employment and collective 
bargaining coverage (see Taylor et al. 2001 for more information on the survey, its 
methodology and representativeness). 
 
 
2. Accounting for the decline of collective bargaining coverage in 
Britain  
 
Millward et al. (2000: 197) show that aggregate collective bargaining coverage in 
Britain (in workplaces with 25 or more employees) fell by 30 percentage points 
between 1984 and 1998, from 70 per cent coverage to 40 per cent coverage. 16 
percentage points of this drop took place in the period 1984 – 1990, the remaining 14 
percentage points in the 1990 – 1998 period. Decline in collective bargaining 
coverage in the 1980s was the result of newly established workplaces choosing not to 
bargain with unions. Union de-recognition in continuing workplaces during this 
period was not common (Beaumont and Harris 1995, Claydon 1989, Disney et al. 
1995, Smith and Morton 1993). Using a simple shift-share analysis, Millward et al. 
estimated that around half of the decline in the 1990 – 1998 period was due to the 
decline of collective bargaining coverage in workplaces with union recognition. The 
other half was due the shrinking employment share of the unionised part of the 
economy. Brown et al. (2002: 201 - 3) build on this analysis. They argue that 
declining union coverage was the result of lower levels of union recognition in new 
establishments, falling coverage in continuing workplaces and individualisation of 
pay-setting arrangements in workplaces that continued to recognise unions, but 
abandoned pay bargaining. Compositional change may also have played a role. The 
first task of this paper is to try to quantify the relative importance of these different 
processes. 
Table one shows that between 1990 and 1998 the proportion of workplaces 
with collective bargaining fell dramatically, while mean coverage in workplaces that   5 
had collective bargaining actually rose (suggesting that workplace with relatively low 
levels of collective bargaining coverage in 1990 were more likely to have abandoned 
it by 1998). It also shows that the incidence of workplace collective bargaining fell in 
continuing (panel) workplaces. Further analysis of the panel shows that a far greater 
number of continuing workplaces abandoned collective bargaining than adopted it. 
Overall, 16% of continuing workplaces abandoned collective bargaining over pay 
while just 1.3% of workplaces adopted it. Of workplaces those continuing workplaces 
that had collective bargaining in 1990 30 per cent had de-collectivised pay-setting by 
1998
1.  
It is interesting to note that only two per cent of workplaces that abandoned 
collective bargaining also formally de-recognised trade unions
2. In the overwhelming 
majority of workplaces that de-collectivised, collective agreements for determining 
pay remained in place even if they did not remain in operation. Of those panel 
workplaces where collective bargaining was operating in both 1990 and 1998, 
bargaining coverage fell in 21 per cent of workplaces (the mean fall in coverage was 
19 percentage points). Coverage rose in 22 per cent of these workplaces (the mean 
rise was 31 percentage points). None of these figures varied significantly between the 
public and private sectors.  
There were also dramatic differences between workplaces that left the WERS 
sample (because they closed or fell below 25 employees, from now on described as 
leavers) and workplaces that opened or grew from below 25 employees (joiners: 
leavers and joiners were identified using the methodology set out in Forth 2000). 
Around 63 per cent of leavers had collective bargaining compared to just 39 per cent 
of joiners. These trends were apparent in both public and private sector workplaces. 
Multivariate shift share analysis was used to estimate the relative importance 
of change in continuing workplaces compared to differences between leavers and 
joiners in explaining overall decline in bargaining coverage. First, regression models 
of the determinants of union coverage for 1990 and 1998 were estimated using the  
WIRS90 and WERS98 cross-sections: 
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Where CB is collective bargaining coverage in workplace i at time t. Con is a 
0/1 dummy with the value of unity if workplace i was operating in both 1990 and 
1998. Therefore the notation shows that separate coefficients were estimated on the 
parameters of the continuing and non-continuing samples. Comp indicates the 
composition of the workforce and related factors like workplace size in workplace i at 
time t. E is an error term. The data were weighted to allow for the impact of the 
complex survey design on each workplace’s probability of selection (Purdon and 
Pickering 2001) and, because the dependent variable of interest is aggregate collective 
bargaining coverage (as opposed to mean workplace collective bargaining coverage), 
each workplace’s overall employment share
3. Preliminary analyses revealed 
significant differences between the public and private sectors, so results are reported 
for the whole sample, private sector workplaces only and public sector workplaces 
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Where CB is collective bargaining coverage, ￿ is the vector of the coefficients 
from the regression model and ￿ is the sample mean. Given the usual assumptions 




 90) is the effect of compositional change keeping propensity to 
unionize at 1990 levels. The second term ((￿
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90  ) is the effect of changing 
propensity to unionize if composition is held at 1990 levels. Since in reality, neither 
propensity to unionize nor composition were held at 1990 levels, the results of the 





90)) balances the equation so that the results are consistent 
with the observed drop in density in the samples (Green, 1992: 454). Table two 
presents the results of the shift-share analysis. Note that figures for total decline in 
 aggregate coverage may vary somewhat from those reported in table 6.5 of
Millward et al. (2000:197) and in table one because workplaces
where it was not possible to establish if the workplace fell into the leaver/joiner or   7 
continuing workplaces categories and workplaces with missing observations for one 
or more of the independent variables were excluded from the analysis.  
Overall, one quarter of the decline in collective bargaining coverage could be 
accounted for by compositional change with the remainder explained by behavioural 
change. Compositional change happened exclusively in continuing workplaces. Just 
over a quarter of the decline was a result of differences between leavers and joiners, 
with the remainder explained by change in continuing workplaces. 
  However, there were significant differences between the public and private 
sectors. Decline of bargaining coverage in the private sector was predominantly down 
to behavioural differences between leavers and joiners. In the public sector, 
Compositional change explained almost one third of the decline in bargaining 
coverage and differences between leavers and joiners did not contribute to declining 
bargaining coverage at all.  
  These findings put the case studies of Brown et al. (1998) in context; what 
Brown et al. call ‘individualisation of pay-setting’ was relatively common and 
significant in the public sector (although the incidence may be overstated if 
workplaces with pay review bodies in 1998 were wrongly classified as having 
collective bargaining in 1990, see note one), but less so in the private sector.  
 
 
3. The determinants of de-collectivisation in continuing workplaces 
 
Freeman and Kleiner (1990) suggest that management will be more likely to resist 
unions when the costs of unionisation are relatively high and the costs of resisting 
unions are relatively low. Brown et al.’s (1998) case studies identify two key stimuli 
for individualisation. First, exogenous shocks for example de-regulation or 
privatisation (which might lead to sudden increases in the cost of unionism). Second, 
as a response to difficult trading conditions which require labour costs to be reduced 
as a matter of urgency. However, they also found that management had a degree of 
strategic choice in deciding how to respond to these circumstances. Management 
could have pursued other options instead of de-collectivisation/individualisation, but 
chose not to (Brown et al. 1998: 14 – 25). Research into union de-recognition in the 
1980s suggested that de-recognition was most likely to occur in workplaces where   8 
union density was relatively low (Claydon 1989). It seems likely that management 
might expect the costs of stopping bargaining with unions to be less in workplaces 
with low union density (because employee support for the union is lower). Some (but 
not all) of Brown et al.’s cases would seem to support this finding
3.  
  The factors associated with ending collective bargaining were investigated via 
a probit analysis on those panel workplaces that had collective bargaining in 1990
4. 
This form of regression analysis was used because the dependent variable (de-
collectivisation) is categorical. The results are reported in table three. 
  De-collectivisation was more likely among workplaces in the gas, electricity 
and water supply SIC group – an industry particularly prone to re-structuring as a 
result of de-regulation and privatisation. Workplaces where collective bargaining 
operated at the level of the workplace were particularly vulnerable to de-
collectivisation, perhaps because these small bargaining units were of less strategic 
importance to the national trade union (Willman 2001), with the consequence that the 
workplace union organisation had fewer resources to draw on in order to defend itself. 
Workplaces with 500 or more employees in 1990 were less likely to abandon pay 
bargaining. Transaction cost economics would suggest that the economies of scale 
from determining pay collectively would be greater in these large workplaces, so 
there would be less incentive for management to de-collectivise. However, 
workplaces that grew in size were more likely to have de-collectivised. This is in line 
with Addison and Heywood’s (2004) finding that employment growth was stronger in 
non-union workplaces. As predicted, de-collectivisation was less likely in workplaces 
with higher levels of union density, and more likely in workplaces with low union 
density. It is also interesting to note that de-collectivisation was more likely in 
workplaces with a higher proportion of female employees; perhaps because employers 
felt that the risk of a backlash from employees was lower with a predominantly 
female workforce.  
 
 
   9 
4. Pay determination and workplace governance in the absence of 
collective bargaining 
 
These issues were investigated using data from the WERS98 management 
questionnaire. The advantages of using the cross-section data here are that it is 
possible to compare results across continuing workplaces and joiners. The data also 
provide richer information about pay-setting arrangements, the pay of individual 
employees and related management practices than the panel dataset. The data were 
broken down into five categories. 1) Continuing workplaces with union recognition 
and collective bargaining (20 per cent of the weighted sample). 2) Joiners with union 
recognition and collective bargaining(11 per cent). 3) Continuing workplaces with 
union recognition but no collective bargaining (as only one per cent of workplaces fell 
into this category in 1990, I am confident that most workplaces in this category in 
1998 had de-collectivised) and continuing workplaces without union recognition and 
collective bargaining where union de-recognition had taken place within the last five 
years. This group was used as a proxy for workplaces that had de-collectivised pay 
setting (12.5 per cent). 4) Continuing workplaces without union recognition or 
collective bargaining where de-recognition had not taken place in the previous five 
years (31.5 per cent). It is assumed that none of these workplaces practised collective 
bargaining in the 1990 –1998 period. However, it is possible that some of these 
workplaces may have de-recognised unions between 1990 and 1993, although given 
the low level of union de-recognition in the 1990 – 1998 period, this is unlikely to be 
a major issue. 5) Joiners without union recognition or collective bargaining coverage 
(25 per cent).  
  Once again, weights were used in the analysis of both data sets in order to 
correct for the complex sample design. As highlighted above, the disadvantage of 
using the cross-section data in this way is that there is a risk that workplaces may be 
misclassified. Specifically, a small number of continuing workplaces may be treated 
as if they have never had collective bargaining when they are actually workplaces that 
de-collectivised pay setting. And a small number of workplaces that are classified as 
having de-collectivised pay setting between 1990 and 1998 may have not practised 
collective bargaining in 1990. There were also a larger number of workplaces that 
were excluded from the analysis because of non-response to the age of workplace   10 
question. However, managers who do not know the age of their workplace are likely 




Collective bargaining could be replaced by a system of wage determination based 
upon either ‘substantive individualisation’ or ‘procedural individualisation’ Brown et 
al. 1998: i). Substantive individualisation occurs when there is differentiation of 
individual employees’ contracts. Procedural individualisation removes collective pay 
determination mechanisms but maintains standardised employment contracts. 
Transaction cost considerations and normative notions of fairness among employees 
may lead employers who de-collectivise pay setting arrangements to favour 
procedural individualisation despite the benefits from substantive individualisation 
predicted by principal-agent theory (Brown et al. 1998: 5 – 8). In the majority of 
organisations studied by Brown et al., collective bargaining was replaced by 
procedural individualisation rather than substantive individualisation.  
  WERS98 provides three measures that might indicate substantive 
individualisation. 1) Whether or not negotiations with individual employees had 
increased in importance over the last five years (asked in continuing workplaces 
only). 2) Whether or not there was a system of performance related pay linked to 
individual performance. 3) Whether or not non-standard contracts were used for 
employees in the largest occupational group. Table four reports the results of probit 
analyses on each of these measures. The results suggest that de-collectivisation and an 
absence of collective bargaining were not significantly associated with an increased 
probability of any of the measures of substantive individualisation. Indeed, continuing 
workplaces that abandoned collective bargaining were actually less likely to use 
performance related pay. Therefore, the demise of collective bargaining has not result 




   11 
4.2 Workplace governance  
 
Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994: 178) offer a typology of employment relations 
management styles that considers the dynamics of employment relations management 
systems. They argue that employers moving away from collective bargaining 
(‘bargained constitutionalism’) towards a system based on individualism can move 
towards a ‘sophisticated human relations’ system based on high commitment 
management, or towards a ‘traditional’ system without employee representation or 
voice based around cost minimisation. Brown et al.’s case studies found rather more 
evidence of the moves towards traditional cost minimisation systems than of moves 
towards sophisticated human relations systems.  
  To investigate these questions, it is first necessary to operationalise the 
employment relations systems proposed by Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994). This is not 
necessarily a straightforward task. There is considerable disagreement about the 
components of Human Resource Management (HRM) / High Involvement 
Management (HIM) etc. (Wood 1999). Here I use an empirically grounded measure 
developed by Wood et al. (2000) based on a latent class model which categorises 
workplaces as ‘low involvement’ ‘medium involvement’ or ‘high involvement’ 
(further details of the methodology involved here can be found in Wood et al. 2000)
5. 
A low involvement approach would seem to fit with Purcell and Ahlstrand’s cost 
minimisation category, while the high involvement approach fits with the 
sophisticated human relations category. A mixed or medium involvement approach 
would appear to suggest a halfway house between collective/constitutional and 
individualist management approaches. Table five presents results of ordered probit 
analyses that investigate the relationship between high involvement management and 
collective bargaining. 
   Results suggest little relationship between collective bargaining or it’s absence 
and HIM. However, results for the private sector only suggest that workplaces which 
abandoned collective bargaining are significantly less likely to have adopted a High 
Involvement Management approach, and are significantly more likely to follow a low 
involvement management approach. Overall, these results suggest that collective   12 
bargaining is not being replaced by individualised ‘high involvement management’ 
and in the private sector at least, the abandonment of bargaining is associated with an 
increased probability of a ‘bleak house’ cost minimisation strategy. 
   
 
5. Outcomes: establishment performance and wage inequality 
 
5. 1 Establishment performance 
 
On the one hand, it might be expected that the opportunity to reduce labour costs that 
de-collectivisation presents (Brown et al. 1998: 52 – 55) would lead to improved 
establishment performance. On the other hand, the fact that establishments that de-
collectivise often do so in response to crisis may indicate that these establishments are 
comparatively poor performers, so even after substantial improvements, performance 
may not rise above average. Furthermore, Brown et al.’s matched case studies found 
that de-collectivisation was by no means the only management strategy for dealing 
with crisis. Strategies of labour management co-operation seemed to be at least as 
successful as de-collectivisation strategies in these circumstances (Brown et al. 1998: 
53). If de-collectivisation invariably led to superior establishment performance, we 
would expect de-collectivisation to have been adopted more widely in continuing 
workplaces.  
  Theory also points in two directions. First, collective bargaining may lower 
productivity by allowing workers to capture rents due to capital so reducing 
investment (Metcalf, 1989). Alternatively, collective bargaining may act as a force for 
economic dynamism because it raises the incentive for management to modernise 
(Nolan and Marginson 1990: 239). Removing collective bargaining may therefore 
remove an incentive to raise productivity. 
Research that claims to demonstrate a link between particular management 
practices and establishment performance based on the analysis of cross-section survey 
data has received heavy criticism from a number of directions (e.g. McCarthy, 1994, 
Addison and Belfield, 2001).  With these criticisms in mind, I proceed with caution. 
The following results do not claim to establish a causal relationship between the 
presence of collective bargaining and establishment performance; the arrow of   13 
causality may run the other way. Any identified relationships may be the result of 
omitted variable bias. There must also be a question mark over the precise meaning of 
self-reported assessments of establishment performance provided by managers. What 
the results do show is whether or not there is a statistically significant association 
between collective bargaining, its abandonment or absence and managerial 
perceptions of firm financial performance and labour productivity compared to other 
firms in their industry. If a positive relationship exists, it would suggest that 
management in de-collectivised workplaces perceive that they are doing better than 
similar workplaces, so that there has been some utility in abandoning collective 
bargaining. 
    Results, with one exception suggest little relationship between collective 
bargaining and its absence and managerial perceptions of establishment performance. 
The exception is reported productivity improvements. Workplaces which have 
abandoned collective bargaining are less likely to report productivity improvements 
well above average and more likely to report average or above average improvements. 
This finding is compatible with the idea that management in workplaces that de-
collectivised are pursuing a low involvement, cost minimisation approach, resulting in 
less impressive productivity gains. Because collective bargaining has been 
abandoned, management have less incentive to improve productivity. However these 
findings are still slightly surprising because they are at odds with the management 
accounts of productivity change in Brown et al.’s case studies.  
 
5.2 Pay dispersion 
 
It is well established that unions reduce pay dispersion through collective bargaining 
(Card 2001; Freeman 1980; Metcalf 1982; Metcalf et al. 2001), and that the decline of 
trade unionism contributed to widening the dispersion of pay in the 1980s (Gosling 
and Machin 1995; Machin 1997). Prassad (2002) has shown that pay dispersion in 
Britain continued to widen during the first half of 1990s, albeit at a slower rate than in 
the 1980s, before stopping in the latter part of the decade. Therefore it seems plausible 
that decline of collective bargaining also contributed to widening wage dispersion in   14 
the 1990s. Brown et al.’s case studies provide some corroboration for this hypothesis: 
“For many firms, the advantage of breaking away from an existing structure of 
collective bargaining was to increase the dispersion of pay, both within grades and 
between hierarchical levels.” Brown et al. (1998: i) 
Recent research by Addison et al. (2003) and Card et al. (2003) has 
investigated the link between de-unionisation and widening wage dispersion in 
Britain. The problem with both of these papers is that they take individual union 
membership as a proxy for union coverage. Over the course of the period that these 
papers investigate, open shop unionism became the norm and free-riding amongst 
workers covered by union bargaining arrangements increased (Charlwood 2003, 
2005) so estimates of the estimates of the impact of collective bargaining on the 
labour market that use union membership as their measure of unionisation will be 
biased. Specifically, because, by excluding free-riders, they investigate the effects of 
unions among those workers where union density is likely to be highest and unions 
strongest, they are likely to overestimate the impact of unions on the labour market. I 
try to overcome this limitation by performing similar analyses to those of Addison et 
al. and Card et al. using data from waves 1 (1991) and 7 (1997) of the British 
Household Panel Survey. These data contain information on both individual wages 
and union coverage. However, they do suggest a smaller drop in collective bargaining 
coverage in the 1990s than the WERS data suggest. In the BHPS, union coverage 
among employees in workplaces with 25 or more employees, from 64 per cent to 57 
per cent; a drop of 7 percentage points. The drop in bargaining coverage among full-
time employees (the focus of my analysis) is nearer to, but still less than that found in 
WERS. 
This discrepancy between the WERS and the BHPS may be the result of a 
number of factors. First, the BHPS missed the decline in coverage that took place in 
1990, this may account for around 2 percentage points of the difference. Second, 
measurement error in the 1990 WERS. If 1990 WERS respondents misclassified 
workplaces that had recently abandoned collective bargaining as practising collective 
bargaining, then WERS will overstate the drop in bargaining coverage in the 1990s. 
Third, measurement error in the BHPS as a result of employees not realising that there 
employer has abandoned collective bargaining while maintaining union recognition 
may bias estimates of collective bargaining coverage in 1997 upwards. Finally, even 
when weighted, the BHPS sample does not fully capture the growth in the number of   15 
employees and changes in the composition of the workforce between 1991 and 1997, 
and this may also account for the discrepancy. Overall, it seems likely that WERS has 
overstated the decline in bargaining coverage slightly as a result of measurement 
error, while the BHPS has understated it as a result of measurement error and the 
panel sample. This needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
  To estimate the impact of the decline of collective bargaining on wage 
dispersion it is necessary to start with a counter-factual. Following the approach of 
Freeman (1993) we could ask what would wage dispersion in 1997 have been given 
the impact of unions on the labour market in 1997 if collective bargaining coverage 
was at the level of 1991? The following formula operationalises this approach. 
 
D97 – D` 97 = (U97 – U91)D97v + (U97 – U91) (1 – U97-U91) D97w
2       (3)  
 
Where D equals the impact of unions on the labour market. U is collective bargaining 
coverage. V is variance and W is wages (so DV and DW are the union wage and 
variance gaps respectively). The problem with this approach is that it does not allow 
for change in the effects of collective bargaining across the two periods. Decline in 
collective bargaining coverage may be symptomatic of a decline in union power, and 
any increase in collective bargaining coverage may also alter the impact of collective 
bargaining. Card (2001) proposes an alternative framework that takes into account the 
changing impact of unions: 
 




91) = U97D97V – U91D91V + U97(1-U97)D97w
2 – U91(1-U91)D91w
2             
                   (4) 
 
Where V
n is the variance in the non-union sector. Note that both formulas calculate 
‘naïve’ estimates of the impact of de-unionisation on wage dispersion because they 
assume that the impact of unions is homogenous across skill groups. In reality, the 
impact of collective bargaining varies according to the skill of the worker and the 
impact of collective bargaining on skill groups changes over time. Card (2001) 
proposes a methodology for estimating the impact of de-unionisation on wage 
dispersion that accounts for the differential impact of collective bargaining on skill 
groups. However, I lack the space in this short paper to follow Card’s (2001) 
methodology in full.   16 
        Table seven reports key descriptive statistics for 1991 and 1997 for full-time men and 
full-time women earning between £1 and £45 per hour in 1997 pounds; the percentage 
covered by collective bargaining, the variance in the union and non-union sectors and 
mean log hourly wage. This shows that variance increased most among unionised 
men and non-union women, and that the variance actually decreased for unionised 
women. Table eight reports the impact of collective bargaining on wage dispersion in 
1991 and 1997 and calculates the results of equations three and four. 
         Overall, table eight shows that variance increased from 0.269 to 0.298 for full-time 
men, while falling slightly from 0.251 to 0.249 for full-time women. Taking full-time 
men first, table eight reveals that if collective bargaining coverage had remained at the 
level of 1991, while the union impact on the labour market had remained the same, 
the increase in the variance observed between 1991 and 1997 would have been a third 
less than it actually was. However, the key change in the union impact on the labour 
market between 1991 and 1997 was the increase in wage dispersion within the union 
sector. This change accounts for all of the increase in overall wage dispersion.  
For women, given the slight overall reduction in wage dispersion in the union 
sector between 1991 and 1997, it is unsurprising to find that wage dispersion would 
have been lower if collective bargaining coverage had remained at the 1991 level. 
Even though collective bargaining coverage fell between 1991 and 1997, collective 
bargaining stopped wage dispersion among women from increasing because of the 
increasingly egalitarian impact of unions on women’s pay in the union sector.  
The key caveat to bear in mind when considering these results is that they are 
based on ‘naïve’ estimates that do not take account of the differential impact of unions 
on skill groups. In the calculations of Card et al (2003) and Addison et al. (2003) the 
impact of unions on wage dispersions was reduced once the differential impact of 
unions on skill groups was taken into account. Nevertheless, these results, based on 
bargaining coverage suggest that the for men at least, the decline of collective 
bargaining and union power did contribute to widening wage dispersion to a much   17 
greater extent than estimates calculated using union membership as a proxy for 
coverage (Card et al 2003, Addison et al. 2003) suggest. 
  
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
The de-collectivisation of pay setting was a highly significant feature of British 
employment relations in the 1990s. In marked contrast to the 1980s management in 
unionised workplaces took advantage of trade union weakness move away from pay 
determination through collective bargaining. Almost one in three continuing 
workplaces that practised collective bargaining in 1990 had stopped bargaining over 
pay by 1998, yet union de-recognition remained rare. This suggests that management 
in these workplaces either substantially re-negotiated the content of collective 
agreements, or simply ceased to bargain without bothering to formally de-recognise 
the union. New workplaces were also significantly less likely to recognise trade 
unions than the workplaces that they replaced. Workplaces were more likely to 
abandon collective bargaining if they had lower levels of union density in 1990, were 
in the water, gas and electricity supply sector or had a high proportion of female 
employees. Overall, The abandonment of bargaining in continuing workplaces 
accounted for around one quarter of the overall decline. The remaining three quarters 
was due to the lower incidence of bargaining in new workplaces compared to the 
workplaces that they replaced. 
These changes do not seem to have bought about substantive individualisation of 
pay setting, although there are signs that this may be on the increase because new 
workplaces without collective bargaining are more likely to use non-standard 
employment contracts.  
At first glance, de-collectivisation of pay setting in continuing workplaces does 
not seem to have contributed to economic efficiency. Private sector workplaces that 
de-collectivised were less likely to follow a high involvement management approach. 
Contrary to the findings of Brown et al. (1998) management were less likely to report 
productivity growth that was well above average for their industry.  
De-collectivisation also had a significant impact on widening wage inequality 
among men (but not among full-time women). Among men, income inequality grew 
as a result of widening wage dispersion among those who remained covered by   18 
collective bargaining. It seems likely that widening wage inequality in the union 
sector and the decline of collective bargaining were both symptoms of deeper union 
weaknesses. However, more research needs to be done to establish the credibility of 
the BHPS as a data-source for investigating wage dispersion, to understand the 
differences between estimates based on membership compared to estimates based on 
coverage and to take into account the differential impact of collective bargaining on 
different skill groups. 
Against these (to my mind) negative outcomes of de-collectivisation must be set 
the finding that workplaces that de-collectivised pay setting were significantly more 
likely to have experienced employment growth. Given the negative effects of 
unemployment on well-being (Layard 2004), a ‘bad job’ may be better than no job.  
Overall these findings raise questions about the Britain’s labour market 
performance in the 1990s because they suggest that Britain’s comparatively low 
levels of unemployment were achieved through a ‘low road’ low productivity route 
and widening inequality as a result of declining union power. Therefore the important 
policy question of how to combine high productivity growth with high levels of 





1. One possible explanation for this finding might be workplaces in the public sector 
switching out of collective bargaining in favour of pay review bodies (PRBs). In 
theory, any workplace with a pay review body in place in 1998 should have had a 
PRB in place in 1990 (e.g. nursing) or have already abandoned collective bargaining 
even if a PRB was not established until after 1990 (e.g. school teachers). However, we 
cannot totally discount the possibility that some of these workplaces may have 
misreported their collective bargaining status and coverage in 1990. 
 
2. Millward et al. (1998: 103) found that just 6 per cent of continuing workplaces de-
recognised unions, my results suggest that only one third of de-recognition cases 
resulted in total union de-recognition.  
 
3. To economise on space, these results are not presented here, but are available from 
the author on request. 
 
4. It would also be interesting to test whether changes in product market competition 
are associated with de-collectivisation (Beaumont & Harris, 1995). Data collection 
errors in the 1990 WERS make this impossible. Beaumont and Harris also show that 
declining union density predicted de-recognition. This approach is not pursued here 
because it raises a chicken and egg question; which came first, falling density or de-
recognition?   19 
 
5. Results were identical to the results of a bivariate probit analysis of the whole 
sample which first conditioned for whether or not a workplace had collective 
bargaining in 1990. The results of the univariate probit on workplaces with collective 
bargaining are presented for simplicity. 
 
6. In preliminary analyses I also experimented with the measure of high involvement 
management developed by Forth and Millward (2004). The problem with Forth and 
Millward’s approach was that two of their measures of a high involvement approach 
(extensive use of financial participation schemes and employment security 
guarantees) were heavily correlated with union recognition. Consequently it is not 
really an appropriate way to operationalize Purcell and Ahlstrand’s typology, which 
sees HIM as an alternative to traditional collective bargaining.  
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Table 1 – The incidence and coverage of collective bargaining among British 
workplaces
1 1990 – 1998 
 


































  1990  1998  1990  1998  1990  1998  1990  1998  1990  1998 
Public 
Sector 
85.6  78.6  75.6  84.3  97  77.1  90  69.8  74.8  62.9 
Private 
Sector 
57.7  30.8  72.7  76.5  59.5  48.3  56.8  26.8  40.6  26.6 
All  67.4  44.5  74.3  80.8  71.2  53.7  62.8  38.7  53.6  38.1 
Source: WIRS 90, WERS98 and WERS98 panel. Weighted base: 2061 (1990 cross-
section), 1929 (1998 cross-section), 379 (1990 leavers), 390 (1998 joiners), 823 (1990 
panel), 846 (1998 panel) 
 
1) Workplaces with 25 or more employees 
   25 
Table 2 – The components of decline in aggregate collective bargaining coverage 
1990 – 1998 






Public Sector       
Compositional 
change 
-0.47  -5.36  -5.83 
Behavioural change  1.12  -13.26  -12.14 
Interaction term  1.56  1.46  3.02 
Total  2.21  -17.16  -14.95 
Private Sector       
Compositional 
change 
-1.15  1.22  0.075 
Behavioural change  -10.94  -3.63  -14.56 
Interaction term  0.19  0.21  0.4 
Total  -11.89  -2.19  -14.08 
All Workplaces       
Compositional 
change 
-0.057  -4.05  -4.62 
Behavioural change  -3.46  -9.78  -13.24 
Interaction term  -0.052  1.65  1.13 
Total  -4.55  -12.18  -16.73 
Notes: Calculated from the results reported in table A1 using multivariate shift-share 
analysis.    26 
Table 3 – the determinants of de-collectivisation of pay setting 1990 – 98 in 
workplaces with collective bargaining in 1990 









Level  of  collective  bargaining  in  1990  (ref.  organisation 
wide bargaining) 
   
Industry collective bargaining  0.447  0.126 
(0.09) 
‘Double-breasting’ arrangements  0.028  0.1755 
(0.18) 
Workplace collective bargaining  0.169  0.374** 
(0.14) 
Change in ownership 1990 - 98  0.155  0.009 
(0.008) 
Public sector in 1990  0.613  0.003 
(0.11) 
Privatised 1990 - 1998  0.031  -0.011 
(0.24) 
Proportion of full-time women in 1990  31.7  0.005** 
(0.0026) 
Industry in 1990 (ref. manufacturing)     
Gas, electricity and water  0.012  0.563** 
(0.253) 
Workplace size in 1990 (ref. 250 – 499 employees)     
25 – 99 employees  0.708  -0.036 
(0.094) 
100 – 249 employees  0.182  0.122 
(0.109) 
500+ employees  0.032  -0.108 
(0.058) 
Change to a lower size band 1990 – 1998  0.086  -0.069 
(0.079) 
Change to a higher size band 1990 – 98  0.09  0.27** 
(0.108) 
Mean predicted probability of de-collectivised pay-setting    0.17 
F (33, 349)    1.97 
Prob > F    0.0015 
Weighted N  382  382 
Calculated from the results of a weighted probit regression. * = statistically significant 
at the 5% level or better, ** = statistically significant at the 1% level or better. 
Controls:  Industry  (1  digit  SIC),  change  in  industry  1990  –  98,  occupational 
composition  of  the  workforce,  proportion  of  the  workforce  part-timers,  change  in 
workforce composition 1990 - 98.  
   27 
For continuous variables (e.g. union density) the marginal effect can be interpreted as 
the  change  in  predicted  probability  of  de-collectivising  if  there  is  a  one  per  cent 
increase in union density. For dummy variables (e.g. the level of collective bargaining 
in 1990) the marginal effect is the change in the predicted probability if the dummy 
variable changes from zero to one. 
   28 
Table 4 – Marginal effects from probit analyses of the determinants of individualised 
of pay-setting arrangements 
 






































































-  0.042 
(0.062) 
Predicted 
probability at the 
sample mean 
0.19  0.14  0.254 
Probability > chi
2  0.000  0.001  0.000 
N  1503  1124  1506 
 
Notes 
1. Controls: Workplace size (banded), private sector, occupational composition of the 
workforce, industry, establishment age. 
2. Regressions were run on data weighted with probability weights. 
3. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
4. * = statistically significant at the 5% level, ** = statistically significant at the 1% 













Table 5 – Marginal effects from an ordered probit analysis on the determinants of 
high involvement management 
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of being in 
category 
0.28  0.55  0.16  0.3  0.61  0.09  0.28  0.54  0.18 




0.000      0.001      0.000     
N  1430      401      1029     
 
Notes 
1. Controls: Workplace size (banded), private sector, occupational composition of the 
workforce, industry, establishment age. 
2. Regressions were run on data weighted with probability weights. 
3. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
4. * = statistically significant at the 5% level, ** = statistically significant at the 1% 
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Table 6 – Marginal effects from ordered probit analyses on the determinants of 
managerial perceptions of establishment performance 
 













Ref:  Continuing 
workplaces  with 
collective bargaining  
       










































Mean  probability  of 
being in category 
0.11  0.39  0.45  0.05 
F  1.08       
Prob > F  0.3619       
N  1302       





       
Joiners with collective 
bargaining 






































Mean probability of 
being in category 
0.4  0.38  0.18  0.04 
F  1.11       
Prob > F  0.3165       




collective bargaining  
       








































(0.017)   32 
Mean probability of 
being in category 
0.15  0.43  0.36  0.06 
F  2.64       
Prob > F  0.0000       
N  1301       
Marginal effects calculated from the results of ordered probit regressions. Results can be interpreted as 
the  change  (from  the  mean)  in  the  predicted  probability  of  a  workplace  falling  into  a  particular 
performance category.  
* = Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, ** = statistically significant at the five per cent level. 
N = 1242 (labour productivity), 1301 (productivity change), 1302 (financial performance).  
Controls: Workplace size (banded), Workforce composition, 1 digit industry classification, 




Table 7 - Union coverage, hourly wages and wage dispersion for employees by 
collective bargaining coverage in 1991 and 1997 
 
  Full-time men  Full-time women 
1991 
 
% of employees 
Variance 
Mean log hourly wage 
Union               Non-union 
 
57.1   42.9 
0.208  0.337 
1.98                     1.80   
 
Union               Non-union 
 
55.2  44.8 
0.203                   0.253 




% of employees 
Variance 




45.7  54.3 
0.249  0.344 
2.0                       1.88 
 
 
44.8                    55.2 
0.19                    0.278             
1.84                    1.88 
 
Samples from waves 1 and 7 of the British Household Panel Survey. Respondents are full-time 
employees in employment whose hourly wage were between £1 and £45 in 1991 points (1997 wages 
deflated by the retail price index). All results were weighted by cross-sectional weights.    33 
Table 8 - Naïve estimates of the contribution of Unions to rising wage inequality 
between 1991 and 1997 
  Men   Women 
1991     
1.1. Variance in log wages  0.269  0.251 
1.2. Collective bargaining coverage  57.1  55.2 
1.3. Adjusted union wage gap  0.075  0.147 
1.4. Union variance gap  -0.129  -0.050 
1.5. Between sector effect   0.001   0.036 
1.6. Within sector effect  -0.074  -0.028 
1.7. total effect  -0.072   0.009 
1997     
2.1. Variance in log wages  0.298  0.249 
2.2. Collective bargaining coverage  45.7  44.8 
2.3. Adjusted union wage gap  0.064  0.093 
2.4. Union variance gap  -0.095  0.008 
2.5. Between sector effect   0.001   0.002 
2.6. Within sector effect  -0.043  -0.039 
2.7. total effect  -0.042  -0.037 
Changes in wage dispersion 1991 – 1997     
3.1. Change in variance  0.029  -0.008 
3.2. Change in variance (%) directly attributable to the decline in 
bargaining coverage (Freeman 1993) 
36  113 
3.3. Change in total effects of collective bargaining on the wage 
structure 
0.03  -0.046 
3.4. Change in variance (%) attributable to change in effects of 
collective bargaining (including change in coverage) (Card 2001) 
103  -187 
Note: All results were weighted by cross-sectional weights. The adjusted union wage 
gap is the union coefficient from a regression analysis controlling for education, 
potential labour market experience in years, potential experience squared and cubed, 
education interacted with experience and dummies for non-white ethnic status, marital 
status, 4 regions, the public sector and workplaces that employ 25 or fewer people. 
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